Andrew Feinstein has performed a valuable service to South Africa with his account of how the arms deal was processed through Parliament. There can be no doubt that what is now required is a thorough forensic audit which will identify whether there was any wrongdoing and by whom.

As a member of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry I was a marginal  participant in the process and was bewildered by all the goings on and unable to come to any conclusion about what was going wrong. The Committee was informed about the offsets promised, and we had sight of the Auditor General’s report but, despite some misgivings, there was so much hullabaloo in the press and such a strong defensive wall by the Ministers concerned that we could not find fault. The Committee therefore approved the report, as far as my memory serves me.

What made it especially difficult was that there was so much whispering by the MP’s in Scopa, including Feinstein, with little hard information made available to the rest of us. ANC  MP’s in Scopa also blamed Feinstein for excessive secrecy and for not reporting fully to them. It all seemed to be a thorough mess. Perhaps the full story will now emerge as a result of Feinstein’s book.

But  other ethical issues that arise from Feinstein’s account. Membership of the ANC is a voluntary act, there is no compulsion whatsoever. Once in, however, the organization asserts certain disciplinary powers, especially over M P’s who are important elements of the public face of the ANC. Indeed throughout the world M P’s are brought to heel on policy matters by the Parliamentary party caucus, and failure to comply generally leads to disciplinary action, expulsion at the extreme.

So what options does a MP have when faced with a serious difference with the party line ? We have all faced this problem at some time. Do you vote against a measure in the House ? make a defiant speech from the podium ? Raise your differences with the leadership ?

It seems to me that Feinstein’s resort to the press in the HIV/Aids briefing by the President was not the right option, since it set him on a course of conduct leading inevitably to a break. Many M P s leak stories to the press, but to carefully record on his Psion, Mbeki’s speech in caucus and then give it verbatim to the Mail and Guardian was wrong.

Curiously, Feinstein’s whole conduct in government was the opposite of this action. As one who worked with Feinstein in various committees, I always felt that he was rather good at ingratiating himself with top people, winning their confidence and rising swiftly up the ladder. His book confirms that he was able to get close to Sexwale and Zuma easily. This was no doubt due to his ability and economic prowess, but  his outright support for Gear showed that  when an issue  was highly unpopular generally,  he was  not an anti- establishment person. Actually, Feinstein reveals that he went along with a great deal of  disguising the consequences of Gear and other stringent economic policies, aligning himself with conservative and cautious economic positions. ’ the movements historic language of revolution was utilized to make palatable an ostensibly neo-liberal approach to the economy.’ P70 . Of Gear, he says, “I was  supportive of this controversial approach.” P 66.

This makes him out to be a somewhat tragic figure. Many M P’s were far more critical of the leadership’s economic policies than Feinstein, yet we stuck it out, preferring to tackle the controversies in the arenas available. Feinstein made the fatal mistake of aligning himself wholly with  Gavin Woods, a member of an opposition party, “Gavin and I started to meet in more secluded places”, and becoming isolated from his ANC comrades. He seems to have decided that the integrity of Scopa took precedence over loyalty to the ANC.

No doubt there may come a time when each and every ANC M P will be faced with the same choice, Parliamentary integrity or ANC loyalty, and the choice will be hard for all of us. What emerges from the book is that Feinstein may have played out his personal tragedy for too long.

I hope, that if ever I may be placed in the same situation, I will first attempt to win over close comrades to share my burden, and then, if I see the writing on the wall, act swiftly.

There may have been talk of a Tsunami, but no one predicted the outcome at the ANC Polokwane conference. The removal of a substantial part of the top echelon of the ANC leadership is without precedent and undoubtedly a jolt to the country and the ANC itself.

The raw facts are astonishing. Six of the most important personalities in the ANC and government stood for election to leading positions and were all voted down. They included the President, Deputy President, Chairperson, the Head of Policy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the National Working Committee. In addition, almost all Ministers and Premiers were denied a place on the National Executive Committee (NEC) and therefore the National Working Committee,(NWC), the highest decision making bodies operating between the five year conferences.

This is not to say that the new leadership is without merit, indeed there are many distinguished personalities in the new NEC, but the removal of so many renowned figures is remarkable and needs careful examination.

I was in a privileged position in the Electoral Commission monitoring the results as they emerged and it was immediately apparent that something dramatic was underway. Not only did the Zuma slate win by a convincing margin, but the margins were almost identical for each  of the six top positions. The most successful candidate  received only 70 votes more than the least successful.

This showed that even though the Electoral Commission had emphasized that the ballot was secret and no delegate was bound by any mandate from their branch or province, voting was almost wholly according to a slate on both sides.

This must have been the most carefully organized campaign for leadership the ANC has ever seen. The signs of intense lobbying were evident at the nomination conferences in the provinces prior to conference, and clearly paid off for the winning team.

So was this a personal victory for Jacob Zuma ? To try to get some answers I joined some delegates at lunch and got more than I expected. In one group of six delegates, from four provinces, I learned that  there was  substantial disappointment  across provinces about government’s performance. They indicated that while Zuma was the spearhead of their campaign, their concerns went much deeper.

While everyone conceded that substantial advances have been made with social reforms, these reforms have not been transformative. Much as the building of RDP houses, the provision of clean water, the  increases in social grants have been welcomed by the poor,  they have not had the cumulative effect of releasing millions  from poverty.

Indeed there seems to be a feeling that the reforms have not altered the basic condition of South Africa with  unacceptable levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality at world record levels. Instead, as ANC leaders have conceded, inequality has increased under ANC rule.

And yet ANC cadres are repeatedly told that we are in the midst of the National Democratic Revolution, that the Freedom Charter is the lodestar, and that the RDP is the main policy instrument. It should come as no surprise  if cadres argue that the piecemeal incremental reforms do not enhance “sharing” as in the Charter’s economic clause, “The People Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth”, and will not deliver  socioeconomic transformation.

So was this a takeover by the Left? Certainly a leftward shift was discernable at the earlier Policy Conference and the same trend was visible at Polokwane. On the other hand both Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale were elected while several leaders of the SACP either failed to be  nominated or elected. Nor are Cosatu leaders really prominent.The ANC remains a broad church with many differing tendencies represented at the highest level.

My impression from further interaction with delegates was that in their view, far too few have  benefited from Black Economic Empowerment or similar schemes. In their experience some job opportunities have opened up, but skill deficiencies are pervasive. The country’s economic advances have not actually empowered many working people because they have either missed out on the necessary upskilling, or  have not been drawn into productive activity, especially  delegates from the former homelands and urban townships.

Of the delegates themselves, many  are in work, but with a mean age of about 38, they are products of Bantu education which did not provide them with the skills needed to advance in a modern capital intensive and technological economy. This has increased their sense of frustration.

Hence the frequent references in the Commissions and Plenaries to the need to advance the “developmental state” which will introduce development into the underdeveloped regions, and bring those millions into the market economy. This was why perhaps the strongest applause was given to the wholly new policy pronouncements on rural development. This is a major departure for the ANC, and will be a huge challenge for the new Executive. It could provide the means for promoting far greater participation in economic and social activity than the market economy generally allows.

What distinguished the Polokwane conference from all the earlier national conferences since the legalization of the ANC,  was the level of  emotional energy evinced by the delegates. True, there were some unpleasant scenes as respected leaders were booed, and toy toying got out of hand. But it cannot be denied that democracy was at work, that a substantial part of leadership was removed from office by normal elections. This is the first time in Africa that this kind of change has occurred within a ruling party and not by the substitution of one party by another.

How the ANC will manage the potential tensions between the leadership of the party and the leadership in the state is not clear. There will doubtless be many lekhotlas  to establish  harmonious relations and a mutual understanding. Perhaps these discussions  will also be more transparent and participatory than in the past.

It is vital  that the succession debate be conducted without acrimony and separated from the forthcoming list process which leads to  membership of Parliament. While formally it is Parliament which elects the future president of the country, in practice it is the ANC National Executive which, as the senior body,  makes the decision. Thereafter that decision is conveyed to the ANC Parliamentary  Caucus which would normally accept  the recommendation and carry it to the National Assembly where the huge ANC majority ensures its adoption.

Many outstanding leaders throughout the world have found that the democratic process can bring triumphs as well as pain. The general view is that the will of the people should prevail. Whether that is what happened at Polokwane will only be decided by history.

(Ben Turok is an ANC veteran,  an M P since 1994, and  the editor of New Agenda, S A Journal of Social and Economic Policy.)

Issue no 29, First Quarter 2008.

The ANC government has tended to be somewhat reticent about its policies on the mining industry. The exception being the legislation dealing with mineral rights. But it has been well understood that mining is a major source of export revenues and employment, and governments have traditionally operated at arms length with the industry. (more…)